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To the Editors (Ryan Snyder and Benoît Pelopidas write):
In their recent article, Keir Lieber and Daryl Press argue that enhanced counterforce ca-
pabilities are increasingly threatening the survivability of nuclear forces.1 They do not,
however, provide a technically valid basis to support this judgment regarding the
United States’ strategic submarine (SSBN) force. This omission raises doubts about
the emergence of any new counterforce era against the U.S. arsenal.
Lieber and Press base their claim partly on sources that reveal how U.S. anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) efforts against Soviet SSBNs during the Cold War beneªted
from advances in acoustic-gathering and data-processing capabilities (pp. 35–36). They
then assume that further advancements within these domains should be expected to
aid ASW efforts once again. Not only does this assumption predetermine Lieber and
Press’s ªndings, but it ignores fundamental limits that physics places on technology
and suggests that an updated review of U.S. SSBN vulnerability is long overdue in the
public domain.
Any such review should consider the key parameter that would drive the planning
and execution of an ASW strategy to trail and destroy the entire SSBN force using pas-
sive acoustics over a considered period: the maximum range at which a U.S. SSBN may
be detected. Neither Lieber and Press nor the most comprehensive source they cite at-
tempts this review,2 but this is the starting point for any serious engagement with the
covert trailing threat.
Although precise information about the acoustic signal emitted by a U.S. SSBN that
determines this parameter is not available in unclassiªed sources, a reasonable estimate
of 90–110 decibels was made for the Ohio-class SSBN in the 1980s,3 with physical con-
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straints permitting a maximum detection range of 1–2 kilometers in deep ocean chan-
nels if a low-frequency SSBN signal is 100 decibels.4 Even with detection ranges almost
certain to be shorter today, further improvements may not offer much gain in military
effectiveness; after all, an SSBN signal must be present some practical distance away for
acoustic detection to remain meaningful. In any case, with a quieter electric-drive pro-
pulsion system and slightly wider hull diameter, the Columbia-class replacement for
the current Ohio-class SSBN will shorten this range further.5
Regarding processing capabilities, Lieber and Press assume that advancements here
could help trailers sift through vast quantities of data to more effectively uncover a sub-
marine signal. But this conºict would depend on already possessing the data to be pro-
cessed, not on collecting it while an SSBN is changing locations. And there is less time
for a trailer to respond to its changing location as the detection range shortens. Today, a
U.S. SSBN could travel far beyond its maximum detection range in the time needed to
collect enough data for processer speed to provide any beneªt.
Maintaining a covert trail also depends on the interaction of the SSBN signal with an
array of hydrophone sensors used for detecting sound waves, where the aid provided
by foreseeable sensor improvements—either enhanced acoustic sensitivities or higher
resolutions of narrow band acoustic tonals—would be of little consequence. Because a
single hydrophone cannot adequately separate an SSBN signal from noise, multiple
hydrophones are required not only to detect an SSBN but also to determine its
directionality to maintain a trail—and launch a weapon in its direction to destroy it. A
greater chance of success here depends on the signal of the trailed SSBN maintaining
correlation over longer arrays of more hydrophones.6 Because this can be practically
maintained for only a few seconds or less,7 this again limits whatever advantages un-
limited data processing can provide. Any acoustic sensor improvements will then be
dominated by the characteristics of the SSBN signal in the ocean environment, the most
effective geometry and size of an array that may be practically deployed, and once
again, the maximum distance at which an SSBN may be detected.
As for the other technological advancements that Lieber and Press identify (p. 37),
their fundamental constraints matter. For example, an SSBN would be aware of any at-
tempt to place it under active trail, with an active signal detected by an SSBN before
and from greater distances than a trailer received its reºection. Regardless of the cir-
cumstances, however, an SSBN that hears an active signal could eject timed explosive
charges at any time to destroy a trailing ºeet. Lieber and Press also left unexplored
questions about the fundamental limits of autonomous drones—which relate to the co-
vert trailing threat—and nonacoustic means of detection.
Without this assessment, Lieber and Press demonstrate only that enhanced counter-
force capabilities have developed against U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles
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(ICBMs) from improved missile accuracy (table 1, p. 26). This merely advances Thomas
Schelling’s argument from thirty years ago that ICBMs are “an embarrassment” be-
cause of their vulnerability to preemptive attack,8 and raises the question whether
Lieber and Press provided an appreciably different analysis now than then of the
counterforce threats against the U.S. arsenal. This invites analysis of the possibly fore-
gone nature of the conclusions they reach, with similar deªnitions, assumptions, and
conclusions found in the writings of Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, and Colin Gray
about strategic contexts decades away from today’s.
—Ryan Snyder
Geneva, Switzerland
—Benoît Pelopidas
Paris, France
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press Reply:
In “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear
Deterrence,” we argued that dramatic improvements stemming from the computer rev-
olution are rendering nuclear arsenals increasingly vulnerable to attack.1 Leaps in accu-
racy have largely negated the strategy of basing nuclear weapons in hardened shelters,
and the revolution in remote sensing is eroding the strategy of concealing nuclear
forces on land or at sea. Ensuring nuclear retaliation after attack, which is the founda-
tion of robust deterrence, is becoming more difªcult.
Ryan Snyder and Benoît Pelopidas criticize our analysis on the grounds that U.S. bal-
listic missile submarines (SSBNs) are essentially invulnerable. They argue that modern
U.S. submarines are extremely quiet, only detectable at short distances, and impossi-
ble to track; therefore, they cannot be destroyed.
Snyder and Pelopidas are correct that the U.S. SSBN force is highly survivable, but
this observation is beside the point. The revolutions in accuracy and sensing threaten
the most powerful country in the world far less than relatively weaker countries. As we
wrote, “To be clear, nuclear arsenals around the world are not becoming equally vul-
nerable to attack. Countries that have considerable resources can buck these trends and
keep their forces survivable, albeit with considerable cost and effort. Other countries,
however—especially those facing wealthy, technologically advanced adversaries—will
ªnd it increasingly difªcult to secure their arsenals, as guidance systems, sensors, data
processing, communication, artiªcial intelligence, and a host of other products of the
computer revolution continue to improve” (p. 10). In other words, countries such as
China, North Korea, Pakistan, and perhaps Russia have far more to worry about than
the United States.
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Although we agree with Snyder and Pelopidas about the current survivability of U.S.
SSBNs, we disagree about two fundamental issues. First, their letter suggests that nu-
clear analysts should view the survivability of U.S. SSBNs as the end of a technological
journey: the creation of submarines that are and will remain undetectable. They assert
that future breakthroughs in submarine detection will be stymied by “fundamental lim-
its that physics places on technology,” and “further improvements may not offer much
gain in military effectiveness.” If one extends their analysis, presumably other coun-
tries’ SSBNs will eventually reach the same technological Valhalla, ending the new era
of counterforce.
In fact, there is no ªnish line in military technical competitions. Even the best weap-
ons and sensors face obsolescence with the emergence of new innovations. Physics
appears to impose limits—for example, darkness and the curvature of the Earth limit
when and how far sensors can “see”—until clever engineers invent devices to work
around those constraints (e.g., thermal sights and satellites). The unending nature of
technological competition means that countries trying to build survivable submarines
must not merely achieve some ªxed level of quietness; they must counter the ever-
evolving remote sensing capabilities of the best resourced military in the world. For
that reason, we expect the new era of counterforce to endure for many years. Further-
more, and critically, the back-and-forth nature of technological competition means
that countries—even the United States—should be wary about relying on any single ca-
pability (such as the survivability of submarines) in an era of exponential technologi-
cal change.
Second, Snyder and Pelopidas dismiss the consequences of the accuracy revolution
by asserting that hardened targets have been vulnerable for decades. The best technical
analyses from the Cold War demonstrate, however, that ICBM ªelds were survivable.2
Those analyses were correct at the time, but their conclusions have been overturned by
the development of pinpoint accuracy. In fact, continued improvements in accuracy are
now making hardened targets vulnerable to even conventional forces—thereby increas-
ing the number of weapons available for disarming strikes and reducing the political
hurdles to conducting attacks.
The strategic deterrence community has grown complacent. Almost every aspect of
the nuclear deterrence equation has changed since the Cold War. Weapons are now
highly accurate; sensors are transforming the target location and tracking mission; and,
against the backdrop of these technological changes, target sets are now much smaller.
Analysts need to appreciate this new era of counterforce so that they can debate its
policy implications and impact on deterrence in the coming decades.
—Keir A. Lieber
Washington, D.C.
—Daryl G. Press
Hanover, New Hampshire
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